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On montre que la croissance du secteur des services facilite la
fragmentation de la production. Les services relient les blocs de production et
permettent la dispersion de la production intégrée. Un pays possédant un grand
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fragmentation.
We show that the growth of the service sector facilitates outsourcing, or
fragmentation of production. Services link production blocks, and allows the
breaking up of integrated production. The cost of aggregate service decreases as
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specialized services tends to export components that are service-intensive. When
international trade in specialized services are permitted, the country with an
advanced service sector will outsource most of the manufacturing activities. Thus
free trade in specialized services tends to increase fragmentation. On the other
hand, if there are high transport costs with a bias against complex specialized
services, then free trade in specialized services may work against fragmentation.
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1 Introduction
There has been a marked increase in the fragmentation of production in re-
cent years. A given nal good (for example, a personal computer, a car) may
include components that are produced at many dierent parts of the world.
The emergence of contract manufacturers of chips, such as Taiwan's UMC
(United Microelectronics Corporation) and TSMC(Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company), and Singapore's CSM (Chartered Semiconduc-
tor Manufacturing) is a spectacular illustration of such fragmentation. It
was Morris Chang, founder and chairman of TSMC, who pointed out to the
world that the semiconductor industry was in fact not one but two indus-
tries, and that it would be best to separate them out
1
. \One industry is
about designing chips, which requires lots of talent but little capital. The
other is about making chips, which requires more capital than talent"(The
Economist, May 19, 2001, p 62). Another well known example of fragmenta-
tion concerns the famous camera, Leica, with lenses produced in Germany,
and other parts produced in Canada, Spain, and the Far East.
To explain the tendency for increased fragmentation, economists have
cited factors such as low labor costs in developing countries that have opened
up and welcome foreign investment, and reduced tranport costs. These fac-
tors alone do not explain why computer chips are made in Taiwan and Sin-
gapore, and car parts are made in Mexico, but these are not made in, say,
Nepal, Vietnam, or Bangladesh. To answer this question, one must take into
account the fact that components are not just \manufactured" by manufac-
turing labor. They have to be marketed, their transportation have to speedy,
and insured, deliveries must be timely, communications with head oÆce or
customers must be eÆcient, contracts must be reliable, etc.All these factors
point to the importance of a service industry that supports and facilitates
manufacturing. An important point is that it is not economical to produce
components in a low wage economy that does not have an eÆcient service
sector.
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model with a manufac-
turing sector, and a service sector. We show how the growth of the service
sector enables the economy to manufacture and export components. The
1
In 1987, Mr Chang founded TSMC, the world's rst \fab", or fabrication plan. Many
\fabless" designers (among which are university-based research centers) have bought ca-
pacity from TSMC. Integrated design manufacturers (IDMS) such as Intel still maintain
that chip design and manufacture go hand in hand.
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range of components that a country can export is shown to depend on the
price of service. We also show how international trade in services may aect
the trade in components, and the degree of fragmentation.
Our story may be summarised as follows. There are two countries, and
advanced country, and a developing country. There are two nal goods, say
bananas and cars. Bananas are produced by labor, and no fragmentation
is possible in banana production. Cars are produced by assembling compo-
nents, such as spark plugs, seat belts, tyres, gear box, transmission, engine,
and so on. To produce these components and connect them with other \pro-
duction blocks", an economy needs both manufacturing labor, and services.
A manufacturer of a given component hires manufacturing labor and buys
and combines services from \service providers", such as an accounting rm,
a marketing rm, a security rm, a bank, a delivery rm, a cleaning con-
tractor, and so on. These service rms have a constant variable cost, and
a xed cost. Thus their average cost falls as their volume of service output
rises. Decreasing average cost is not compatible with price-taking behavior.
Therefore we assume that the service industry is characterized by monopo-
listic competition: each service rm faces a downward sloping demand curve,
and sets its price, taking as given the prices of imperfect substitutes set by
other service rms.
The number of dierent services that an economy can oer depends on its
stage of development and the size of the economy. For example, a matured
economy such as the US has more specialized services than less matured ones,
such as Indonesia. A large economy, such as Germany, can oer more services
than a small economy, such as New Zealand, even if the two economies have
the same level of human capital per person.
We argue that the greater is the range of services, the more eÆcient is the
production of components. On the other hand, a country that has a greater
range of services may have a more expensive service price, perhaps due to
higher labor cost. For example, a computer programmer in the US earns
more than his couterpart working in India. The trade-o between range of
services and costs of individual services determine what types of components
will be produced in which country. We expect that a component that has a
high ratio of service to manufacturing labor will be produced in the country
that has a greater range of services.
In writing our paper, we have beneted from the the insightful discussions
on fragmentation, contained in Jones and Kierzkowski. (1990, 2001a,b).Jones
and Kierzkowski (1990) proposed a distinction between integrated and frag-
2
mented technologies.Under the integrated technology, the manufacturing of
a good takes place within a single production block, and the role of services is
rather limited. Fragmented technology requires that service links connect in-
dividual production blocks. \These links can be best thought of as consisting
of bundles of activities- coordination, transportation, telecommunication, ad-
ministration, insurance, nancial services, and so on." (2001a, p 368). How-
ever, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) did not model the service sector. They
focussed attention on the case in which one integrated production activity
gets segmented into two components as a result of an exogenous reduction in
the cost of international service links.Jones and Kierzkowski (2001b) devoted
a short section to the role of services in fragmentation. They mentioned two
stylized facts about the costs of service links: \First, purely domestic ser-
vice links are less costly than those required to connect production blocks
located in more than one country...Second, production of services displays
strong increasing returns to scale." The second stylized fact seems to call
for a departure from a model based on perfect competition. Our paper is
attempt to move in that direction.
Various aspects of fragmentation have been studied by a number of au-
thors. Arndt (1997) showed that intra-product specializationcan be a source
of gains from trade. harris (1993, 1995) focussed on the role of telecommu-
nications. Hanson (1996) mentioned fragmentation in the context of trade
between Mexico and the United States. Feenstra (1998) linked the integra-
tion of trade with the disintegration of production.Ra (2001) discussed the
role of direct foreign investment in services. Deardor (1998, 2001) provided
insightful discussions of the role of services in coordinating the fragments.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple
model of a closed economy with a service sector. In section 3, we characterize
the autarkic equilibrium. Section 4 considers two economies with dierent
numbers of specialized service rms, and shows how the pattern of trade in
components is determined, given that there is no trade in services. Section 5
allows trade in services. Section 6 discusses some generalisations of the basic
model.
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2 A model of a closed economy with a service
sector
2.1 The service sector
An aggregate service is produced using specialised services as inputs. There
are n specialised services (e.g., accounting, marketing, legal service, auditing,
security...). We let S denote the number of units of aggregate service pro-
duced, and m
i
denote the units of specialised service i, used as input in the
production of the aggregate. We assume the following production function:
S = [m

1
+ ::::+m

n
]
1=
(1)
where 0 <  < 1. For example, if  = 1=2 and n = 2, then using 4 units
of specialized service 1 and zero unit of specialized service 2 will result in 4
units of aggregate service, while using 2 units of each specialized service will
result in 8 units of aggregate service. (This idea of gains from specialization
was forcefully put forwards by Adam Smith: 4 brick layers can build 4 houses
in one year, but two brick layers and two carpenters can build 8 houses in
one year.)
Let p
i
be the price of a unit of specialised service i. The cost of producing
one unit of aggregate service is the solution of the cost minimization problem
P
S
= min
m
i
n
X
i=1
p
i
m
i
subject to
"
X
i
m

i
#
1=
= 1
The solution yields
P
S
=
"
n
X
i=1
p
=( 1)
i
#
( 1)=
(2)
From Shephard's lemma, the conditional factor demand function (here,
for the specialised service i) given that we must produce one unit of the
4
aggregate service is
m
d
i
(p; S = 1) =
@P
S
@p
i
= Ap
1=( 1)
i
where
A 
"
n
X
j=1
p
=( 1)
j
#
 1=
If S units of the aggregate service is to be produced, the conditional factor
demand is
m
d
i
(p; S) = ASp
1=( 1)
i
(3)
It does not matter in our model whether aggregate services are produced
by \aggregate service rms" that buy specialialized services, and sell aggre-
gate services in the market, or whether aggregate services are produced by
users of the aggregate service (such as a manufacturer of a car component.)
In the latter case, P
S
is the cost (rather than the price) of a unit of aggregate
service.
Concerning the industry that produces the n specialised services, we as-
sume it consists of service rms that operate under monopolistic competi-
tion.We assume that service rm i produces the specialised service i: Service
rm i takes the function (3) as the demand function that it faces. It takes
S as given, and even though it can inuence p
i
, we assume it takes A as a
constant. (This is the the assumption made by Dixit and Stiglitz). Inverting
(3), we get the inverse demand function
p
i
=
h
m
i
AS
i
 1
= p
i
(m
i
)
The marginal revenue is
MR
i
= p
i

1 
1


= p
i
where  is the elasticity of demand
   
d lnm
i
d ln p
i
=
1
1  
> 1
5
We now turn to the production of specialised service i. We assume that
to produce m
i
units of specialised service i, the service rm i must incur xed
cost and variable cost. Assume the xed cost is F = wf and the variable cost
is cwm
i
, where c is a positive constant representing the amount of units of
labor required per unit of service output, and w is the wage rate, which the
rm takes as given.Since the rm equates marginal revenue with marginal
cost, we have
p
i
= cw
Non-negative prot requires
p
i

F
m
i
  cw (4)
and prot is
r
i
= pm
i
  cwm
i
  wf =

1  


cm
i
  f

w (5)
In a symmetric equilibrium, p
i
= p
j
= p, so (2) gives
P
S
= n
( 1)=
p = n
( 1)=

cw


(6)
This equation says that the greater is the number of specialised services, the
lower is the price (=cost) of a unit of aggregate service.
The sum of prots in the service industry is
R = nr
i
= n

1  


cm
i
  f

w (7)
2.2 The goods sector
The goods sector is perfectly competitive. The economy produces two nal
goods, denoted by X and Y . To produce one unit of good Y , the input
requirement is a
Y
units of labor. Thus
P
Y
= wa
Y
To produce one unit of good X (say a car), k components must be as-
sembled: e.g., spark plugs, seat belts, tyres, gear box, engine, etc. Dene
6
units of measurement so that each car needs exactly one unit of each of the
k components. We assume that assembling a car requires g units of labor
and 
X
units of services. Then the price of a car is the sum of the prices
(denoted by 
j
) of the k components and the cost of assembling:
P
X
= 
1
+ 
2
+ ::: + 
k
+ gw + P
S

X
To produce one unit of component j, two inputs are required: one unit of
labor and 
j
units of aggregate service. The price of component j is therefore

j
= w + 
j
P
S
The price of good X is then
P
X
= (k + g)w +P
S
= (k + g)w +n
( 1)=

cw


where
  
X
+
X

i
denotes the number of units of aggregate service required per unit of good
X.
It follows that, for given n, the economy has the following property of a
Ricardian model: the prices P
X
, P
S
, and P
Y
are determined only by tech-
nology.
2.3 Consumers
In this economy, the prots of the service rms are in general positive in
equilibrium. So national income is the sum of labor income and prot
M = wL+ n

1  


cm
i
  f

w (8)
Assume that the labor supply L is xed. The representative consumer solves
max
X;Y
U(X; Y )
subject to
P
X
X + P
Y
Y =M
7
where P
Y
= 1 and M is his income Assume that U(X; Y ) is homothetic.
Then the demand functions takes the form
X
d
= 
X
(P
X
; P
Y
)M (9)
and
Y
d
= 
Y
(P
X
; P
Y
)M (10)
where, in view of the budget constraint,
P
X

X
(P
X
; P
Y
) + P
Y

Y
(P
X
; P
Y
) = 1 (11)
3 Autarkic equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium,
m
i
= n
 1=
S = n
 1=
X
d
= n
 1=

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)M (12)
Substituting (12) into (8), we get
M = wL+ w

1  


cn
( 1)=

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)M   wfn
hence
M =
(L  fn)w
1  w
 
1 


cn
( 1)=

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)
The equilibrium output of X is then
b
X =
(L  fn)w
X
(P
X
; P
Y
)
1  w
 
1 


cn
( 1)=

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)
(13)
Remark: Note that, in view of (11),
w

1  


cn
( 1)=

X
(P
X
; P
Y
) = (1  )P
S

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)
8
< (1  )P
X

X
(P
X
; P
Y
) < 1  
Example: With Cobb-Douglas utility, U = X

Y
1 
P
X
X
d
= M
that is
P
X

X
(P
X
; P
Y
)M = M
or

X
(P
X
; P
Y
) =

P
X
(14)
Substituting (14) into (13), we get
b
X =
w(L  fn)
P
X
  w
 
1 


cn
( 1)=
b
X =
(L  fn)
(k + g)w +n
( 1)=
 
cw


[1  (1  )]
> 0
3.2 A modied version of the model
From this point onwards, for convenience, we assume that there is a contin-
uum of components, represented by the interval [0; k]. Let  be the index for
the component. The price of component  is (), and the price of the car is
P
X
= 
X
P
S
+
Z
k
0
( )d
where
() = w + ( )P
S
Assume for simplicity that
() = b
Then we can draw the graph of () as a function of 
( ) = w + bP
S
This graph is a straight line with slope bP
S
. In autarkic equilibrium,
( ) = w + bn
( 1)=

cw


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4 Trade in goods, and fragmentation
4.1 Assumptions
Now consider a two country world. The home country is the US, the foreign
country is Mexico. All consumers have identical preferences. The endow-
ments of labor are L and L

: There are n service rms in the US, and n

service rms in Mexico, where n

< n. We assume, in this section, that
SERVICES ARE NOT INTERNATIONALLY TRADED, while components
can be traded. Mexico has the component price curve


() = w

+ b

(n

)
( 1)=

c

w



We assume a

Y
> a
Y
. Then Mexico's wage is lower than US wage:
w

< w:
If the slope b

b
P

S
> b
b
P
S
, then the two curves 

() and ( ) will intersect at
a point 
I
. Mexico will export those components with index  < 
I
and the
US will export (if Mexico also assembles cars at the new equillibrium) those
components with  > 
I
.
One may assume that
g

> g
and g

  g is so great that Mexico does not
2
assemble cars when it can buy
cars from the US.
4.2 Free-trade equilibrium (without trade in services)
Assume that services are not internationally traded. To nd a free-trade
equilibrium, let us at rst consider the simple case where the assembling of
components does not require services, that is, 
X
= 

X
= 0. Assume that g

is much greater than g, so that car assembling takes place only in the US.
Let P
X
(= P

X
) denote the world price of good 1 (cars) under free trade, and
P
Y
= P

Y
= 1.
2
Alternatively, one may assume that the cost of assembly is zero, and service is not
needed for assembly. Then consumers do not buy cars, they buy components and assemble
the cars themselves.
10
World income, in terms of good Y , is the sum of labor income and prots
Z  wL+ w

L

+ n

1  


cm  f

w + n


1  


cm

  f


w

(15)
where
w =
1
a
Y
if good 2 is produce in the home country, otherwise
w >
1
a
Y
similarly,
w

=
1
a

Y
if good 2 is produce in the foreign country, otherwise
w

>
1
a

Y
World demands for good 1 and good 2 are
X
!
= 
X
(P
X
; 1)Z = 
X
(P
X
; 1)Z (16)
Y
!
= 
Y
(P
X
; 1)Z = [1  P
X

X
(P
X
; 1)]Z (17)
Suppose that in equilibrium, the foreign country exports components with
index  in the range [0; 
I
] and the home country exports components with
index  in the range [
I
; k]. Then the total quantity of aggregate services
supplied by the foreign country is
S

=

Z

I
0
b

d

X
!
=
1
2
b


2
I
X
!
(18)
Similarly, for the home country,
S =

Z
k

I
bd

X
!
=
1
2
b

k
2
  
2
I

X
!
(19)
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We also have
m = n
 1=
S
m

= (n

)
 1=
S

Since 
I
is the intersection of the two component-price curves, it must be the
case that for component 
I
the production costs in both countries are equal:
w

+ b

P

S

I
= w + bP
S

I
(20)
That is,
w

+ 
I
b

(n

)
( 1)=

c

w



=
w + 
I
bn
( 1)=

cw


(21)
Equation (21) determines 
I
as a function of n, n

, w and w

:We assume
n > n

. Then

I
= 
I
(n; n

; w; w

) =
w   w


> 0 (22)
where
  b

(n

)
( 1)=

c

w



  bn
( 1)=

cw


> 0
provided that n is suÆciently great relative to n

:
Lemma: 
I
(n; n

; w; w

) is an ncreasing function of with w and n

, and
is a decreasing function of w

and n.
Proposition 1
(i) The foreign country exports components in the range [0,
I
] (i.e., com-
ponent that are less service-intensive) and the home country exports compo-
nents that are more service-intensive).
(ii) An increase in n

or a decrease in c

will result in a greater range of
components exported by the foreign country. (In other words, it will increase
\fragmentation", or \outsourcing" by the home country's car industry.)
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(iii) An increase in w

will result in a decrease in the range of components
exported by the foreign country.
Proof: obvious
Now, since the price of good 1 must equal the cost of production, in a
free trade equilibrium, we must have
P

X
= P
X
=
b
P
X
=

Z

I
0
(w

+ b

P

S
)d

+

Z
k

I
(w + bP
S
)d

(23)
More precisely
P

X
= P
X
=
b
P
X
=

Z

I
0
(w

+ b

P

S
(n

; w

))d

+

Z
k

I
(w + bP
S
(n; w))d

Observation 1: Since
b
P
X
is the area under the kinked curve dened by
the lower bound of the two curves 

() and (), we may write this as
b
P
X
=
Z
k
0
min [

( ); ( )] d 
b
P
X
(w;w

; n; n

) (24)
(An explicit expression for
b
P
X
is given in the Appendix.) Notice that, if we
assume that good Y are produced in both countries, then w = 1=a
Y
and
w

= 1=a

Y
, and the equilibrium price
b
P
X
is independent of demand.
Using Observation 1, we can state
Proposition 2:
b
P
X
is an increasing function of w and w

and is a
decreasing function of n and n

:
Proof: obvious from Observation 1.For a more formal proof, see Ap-
pendix 2
Let us now compute the equilibrium output of cars. First, we must cal-
culate world's income, Z. From (15),
Z = wL+ w

L

  wnf   w

n

f + 
where
 

1  


[cwnm+ c

w

n

m

]
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Using
m = n
 1=
S = n
 1=
b[k
2
  
2
I
]X
!
and m

= (n

)
 1=
S

= (n

)
 1=
b


2
I
X
!
we get
 = qX
!
where
q  (1  )

(w   w

)
2


+

1  


bcwk
2
n
( 1=)
b
Thus (16) gives
X
!
= 
X
(
b
P
X
; 1) [wL+ w

L

  wnf   w

n

f + qX
!
] (25)
Since
b
P
X
has been deternined in (24), equation (24) determines the equilib-
rium X
!
:
b
X
!
=

X
(
b
P
X
; 1) [wL+ w

L

  wnf   w

n

f ]
1  q
X
(
b
P
X
; 1)
> 0
Note that since 1 P
X
(P
X
; 1) = 
Y
(P
X
; 1) > 0 and since P
X
> q, we have
1  q
X
(
b
P
X
; 1) > 0. (qX
!
< P
X
X
!
because the value of output of X must
exceed the value of prots to the service industry, by the accounting identity
that revenue equals the sum of payments to inputs.)
5 Trade in services
Now suppose that services are internationally tradable. We consider two
cases: (i) complete free trade in services, which equalizes the prices of ser-
vices, and (iii) trade in services with transport costs (e.g. the \iceberg trans-
portation cost" model.)
We assume that, before the opening of trade in services, the n

services
produced in the foreign country have their exact counterparts in the home
country. (The home country has n   n

services that are not produced
in the foreign country. We number services so that the rst n

services are
produceable in both countries, and the last n n

services cannot be produced
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in the foreign country. With trade in specialized services, the production
function of aggregate services in the home country is
S =
"
X
i
(m
i
+m

i
)

#
1=
and thus the price is
P
S
=
"
n
X
i=1
[min(p
i;
p

i
)]
=( 1)
#
( 1)=
if there is no transportation cost. If the transport cost is positive, and is of
the iceberg type, then
P
S
=
"
n
X
i=1
[min(p
i
; Æ
i
p

i
)]
=( 1)
#
( 1)=
where Æ
i
> 1:Here, 1=Æ
i
is the fraction of one unit of service i that remains
after being transported. By convention, if the foreign country cannot produce
service n  j, then p

n j
is any number greater than p
n j
(j  n  n

):
5.1 Complete free trade in services
Recall that the autarkic price of the aggregate service in the foreign coun-
try is P

S
= (n

)
( 1)=
(c

w

=) and that of the home country is P
S
=
(n)
( 1)=
(cw=). By assumption P

S
> P
S
(because n is much greater than
n

), complete free trade in services will result in the export of specialised
services( indexed  n) from the home country to the foreign country, and
the equalization of service prices. The home country will stop producing spe-
cialized services   n. The equalization of the price of aggregage services
means that, under free trade in services, the costs of producing components
are lower in the foreign country. The home country will therefore stop pro-
ducing all components: all the car components are produced in Mexico, and
the cars are assembled in the US (recall our assumption that g

is much
greater than g.)
Proposition 3: Free trade in services results in complete outsourcing of
component manufacturing to the foreign country.
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5.2 Incomplete free trade in services
This occurs when there is an \iceberg transportation cost" of services. Then
service prices are not equalized. Still, the eect of the incomplete free trade
in services is the narrowing of the gap between P

S
and P
S
. The foreign
country imports the last n   n

services from the home country, and the
home country may import the rst n

services from the foreign country, but
the price of aggregate service in the foreign country may remain higher than
in the home country. In this case, the curve 

() is rotated downwards,
leading to an increase in 
I
.
Proposition 4: Incomplete free trade in services may result in an in-
crease in the range of components exported by the foreign country.
6 Generalisation: services with increasing com-
plexity
We now relax the assumption that all services cost the same. We introduce
the idea that some services are more complex than others. It is convenient
to have a continuum of services, indexed by  in [0; n] :The greater is , the
higher is the variable cost c():
6.1 Assumptions for a closed economy
The production function of the aggregate service is
S =

Z
n
0
[m()]

d

1=
Let p() be the price of the specialised service . Then
P
S
=

Z
n
0
[p()]
=( 1)
d

( 1)=
(26)
The conditional demand for service  is
m() = AS[p()]
=( 1)
where
A =

Z
n
0
[p()]
=( 1)
d

 1=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Each specialised service rm equates maginal revenue to marginal cost.
This gives
p() =
wc()

(27)
Substituting (27) into (26), we get
P
S
=
w


Z
n
0
[c()]
=( 1)
d

( 1)=
For concreteness, let
c() = c
0


where   0; then

Z
n
0
[c()]
=( 1)
d

( 1)=
=
c
0
K
[n]
(+ 1)=
where we assume that
K =
 +   1
  1
> 0
Then
P
S
=
wc
0
K
[n]
(+ 1)=
(If  = 0, we have the result in the main text)
6.2 The two-country case
With two countries, the range [0; n] overlaps with the range [0; n

] where
n

< n. The cost of producing specialised service  in the home country is
p() =
wc
0



and that of the foreign country is
p

() =
w

c

0






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where we assume


>  > 0
Dene the cost ratio
v() =
p()
p

()
Assume w

c

0
< wc
0
. Then v(0) = .(wc
0
=w

c

0
) > 1, and there exists a unique
e such that
v(e) = 1 and v() < 1 for all  > e
We assume that e < n

< n: Then the home country has comparative ad-
vantage in producing complex services.
6.3 Free trade in services without transport costs
With free trade in services, the foreign country will import all services in the
range [e; n], (and export the less complex services. if assembly needs services
and can only be done in the home country). All components will be produced
in the foreign country (because the prices of aggregate service P
S
and P

S
are
equalised, and component production requires direct labor, which is cheaper
in the foreign country) as well as aggregate services).
6.4 Free trade in services with transport costs
Assume instead that trade in services involves transport cost (of the iceberg
type), and that the transport cost of specialised services from the foreign
country to the home country is low (say zero), while the transport cost of
complex specialised services (those with index greater than e) is prohibitively
expensive. Furthermore, we assume it is not possible to transport aggregate
services. Then free trade will result in the foreign country exporting all the
services with   e: The eects on the prices of aggregate service are: P
S
be-
comes smaller, while P

S
is unchanged. Under these circumstances, the range
of components produced in the foreign country will contract. Thus trade in
services can lead to less fragmentation when there are transportation costs
that are biased against complexed services produced by the home country.
Proposition 5: Trade in services in the presence of transportation costs
that are biased against the more complex specialised services supplied by the
home country may lead to reduced fragmentation of manufacturing.
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7 Concluding remarks
We have showed that the fragmentation of manufacturing depends on the
level of development of the service industry in each country. Advanced
economies have higher cost of supplying simple services, but they have a
greater variety of services, so that their price of \aggregate service" tends
to be lower than those of less developed economies. As a result, advanced
economies tend to produce components that are service-intensive, and out-
source the manufacturing of components that are less service-intensive to
developing countries that have a basic service sector. Complete free trade in
service will lead to complete outsourcing of components. Trade in services
under non-negligible transport costs will result in partial fragmentation of
manufacturing. If transport costs are biased against complex services, then
a reduction in transport costs for less complexed services can reduce frag-
mentation.
We have assumed that the number of specialized services that a country
can produce is given. This is a simplication that should eventually be
relaxed. As countries grow, the number of services also tends to grow. It
is tempting to endogenize n, the number of services, by allowing free entry
and letting the \zero prot condition" determine the equilibrium n. In our
model, we assume that each service rm must incur a xed cost, in terms of
labor. We should interpret \labor" in the sense of human capital. Then a
country that invests in human capital will increase its \labor" force, and will
be able to support a greater number of specialised service rms.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: An explicit expression for
b
P
X
.
Denote the equilibrium value by
b
P
X
:Then
b
P
X
: = w


I
(n; n

; w; w

) + w [k   
I
(n; n

; w; w

)]+

1
2

b

P

S
(n

; w

) [
I
(n; n

; w; w

)]
2
+

1
2

bP
S
(n; w)

k
2
  [
I
(n; n

; w; w

)]
2
	
(28)
IF BOTH COUNTRIES PRODUCE GOOD 2 (bananas) THEN w and w

are determined by w = 1=a
Y
and w

= 1=a

Y
. IN THAT CASE, equation
(28) a determines the relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2 as functions
of (a
Y
,a

Y
,; L,L

). (recall that P
X
= P
X
=P
Y
because P
Y
= 1).Then, after
substituting (22) and (6) into (28) we get
b
P
X
=
3
2

(w   w

)
2


+ wk +
1
2
bn
( 1)=

cw



k
2
 
2k(w   w

)


(29)
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1
From (23),
@
b
P
X
@w

=
Z

I
0
@

( )
@w

d + 

(
I
)
@
I
@w

  (
I
)
@
I
@w

=
Z

I
0
(1 + b


@P

S
@w

)d > 0
Other results can be established by a similar argument.
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